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INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance law is famously complex. At the federal level,
“[c]ampaign finance regulations . . . impose unique and complex rules
on 71 distinct entities . . . subject to separate rules for 33 different
types of political speech.”1 But the federal component is but one part
of the overall system. Each of the fifty states, and numerous
municipalities, has its own often-idiosyncratic regime.
Many areas of the law feature interlocking state and federal
regulations, and sophisticated entities regularly employ legal counsel
to help them navigate those requirements. But most areas of the law
do not regulate activity “at the heart of the First Amendment.”2 Nor
do they purport to cover unsophisticated individuals and small
groups. By contrast, many state systems impose registration and

* Legal Director, Center for Competitive Politics.
** Staff Attorney, Center for Competitive Politics.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
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reporting requirements on groups raising and spending far less than a
thousand dollars.3
Of course, there is always the danger that civically-minded
individuals will not foresee the dangers of noncompliance involved
with soliciting $20 donations,4 accepting donated materials for fliers,5
or receiving pro bono legal advice.6 But even where individuals or
groups are aware of the need to determine and comply with local
campaign finance rules, they may find that those rules are unclear or
overwhelmingly complex.
This complexity poses a constitutional difficulty because “[p]rolix
laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech:
People of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the law’s
meaning and differ as to its application.”7 This is why the Supreme
Court has noted that “rigorous adherence [to the promotion of
bright-line rules] . . . is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not
chill protected speech.”8
There has been substantial and controversial litigation concerning
the scope and interpretation of state and federal campaign finance
laws. But litigation is expensive, and not all speakers wish to bear the
burdens or notoriety associated with constitutional challenges.
Some—indeed most—simply wish to know what is required of them,
with every intention of studiously complying with their legal duties. If
they cannot gain concrete guidance, they may not speak. This is
especially true given the severe penalties provided by many state
campaign finance systems, and the prevalence of private rights of
action (often used by political opponents),9 which together make the
costs of legal errors potentially orders of magnitude greater than the
value of the original activity.10
3. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 106.011(1)(A) (2012) ($500); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-534(2)(A) (2012) ($500); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.203(4) (2012) ($500); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 17-25-3(10) (2012) ($10).
4. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) (2012).
5. See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010).
6. See Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
7. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1251.
10. In Florida, failure to report a required contribution makes any candidate,
treasurer, or PAC officer “subject to a civil penalty equal to three times the amount
involved in the illegal act.” FLA. STAT. § 106.19(2) (2012). In Colorado, fines start at
$50 per day (including holidays and weekends) and continue for perpetuity until any
deficiencies are resolved. COLO. CONST. art XXVIII, § 10(2)(a).
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At the federal level, this concern is somewhat ameliorated by the
FEC’s ability to provide advisory opinions. There have been
hundreds of these opinions written to date.11 An advisory opinion
request, however, will not always be granted. This is because there
are six commissioners, four of whom must vote to approve an
advisory opinion, and no more than three commissioners may be of
the same political party.12 Tie votes on advisory opinions do occur.13
But obtaining an advisory opinion conveys a number of advantages.
Most importantly, abiding by the opinion immunizes the requester
against legal liability.
The states should consider the federal system, in this instance, as a
model. By creating advisory opinion mechanisms that concretely
advise potential speakers as to their rights and responsibilities, state
and local governments can eliminate a major constitutional infirmity:
vague, unclear, and prolix statutes that do not provide adequate
guidance and force risk-averse speakers to be silent.
State systems should borrow three elements from the federal
model. First, there should be a single officer or agency empowered
with the interpretation of campaign finance laws and with the
authority to issue advisory opinions concerning their operation.
Second, that agency should be the same entity charged with enforcing
the campaign finance laws. And third, there should be complete legal
immunity for any requester, or similarly-situated person or entity,
that follows the guidance given in an advisory opinion.
Table 1 categorizes each of the fifty states based on their adherence
to this model. By our count, thirteen states have systems that closely
conform to the federal model. The remaining states have one or
more deficiencies. In some cases, states have no advisory opinion
mechanism at all and provide little guidance and no safe harbor for
activists and political committees wishing to understand the
requirements of local law.

11. On the other hand, the sheer number of Advisory Opinions (AOs) issued by
the Commission, and the Commission’s tendency to use them as precedent for
subsequent action, also pose a danger. The FEC may be developing a body of law
too complex to give adequate guidance to individuals and groups wishing to discuss
federal issues and candidates.
12. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2006).
13. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40779, DEADLOCKED VOTES
AMONG MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC): OVERVIEW AND
POTENTIAL
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
CONGRESS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.bradblog.com/wp-content/uploads/CRS_FEC_Deadlocks.pdf.
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This Article summarizes these results and the lessons learned from
them. In particular, we examine a number of ways in which states
have failed to develop comprehensive advisory opinion mechanisms.
Indeed, despite the large volume of legislation designed to tighten
campaign finance laws, and the resulting complexity seen at the state
level, most states seem to have entirely overlooked the importance of
a comprehensive advisory opinion mechanism.
I. THE FEC’S ADVISORY OPINION SYSTEM
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the administrative
agency charged with enforcing the federal campaign finance laws.14 It
is a troubled entity: the last few years have seen a string of major
decisions deadlock on partisan 3-3 votes;15 an inability to nominate
and confirm new commissioners has led to all serving commissioners
staying beyond their assigned terms;16 and the agency’s rules have on
occasion been invalidated by federal courts.17 Yet because the
alternative to an independent commission is enforcement of
campaign finance laws by politically-entangled entities, the FEC
appears to be here to stay.18
Despite its weaknesses, the Commission has an important and
praiseworthy role. The agency’s advisory opinion power allows it to
expeditiously clarify what the federal campaign finance regime
requires, helping to limit the law’s troubling ambiguity. Under the
current system, any party that plans to engage in some activity that
may brush against the campaign finance system may petition the FEC

14. See About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/
about.shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
15. See, e.g., Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., FEC Deadlocks On Attempted
available
at
Evasion
of
Disclosure
Laws
(June
14,
2012),
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=1766:june-14-2012-fec-deadlocks-on-attempted-evasion-of-disclosure-laws&catid
=63:legal-center-press-releases&Itemid=61; Rick Hasen, FEC Deadlocks 3-3 on
Ruling Whether Super PAC’s Ads Copied Campaign Ads, ELECTION L. BLOG (Feb.
27, 2012), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=30648.
16. Alex Knott, More FEC Terms Expire, but Replacements Unlikely, ROLL
CALL (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_105/-204592-1.html (“The only
commissioner who will be serving an unexpired term . . . is Republican Caroline C.
Hunter . . . for a term that expires in April 2013.”).
17. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
18. See Robert A. Bicks & Howard I. Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election
Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975, 1000 (1953) (noting
that campaign finance disclosures were initially handled in-house by “the Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the Senate”).
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for such an opinion.19 The Commission must act on these advisory
More
opinion requests (AORs),20 often within thirty days.21
importantly, the Commission’s answer on an AOR is binding on the
agency in that the FEC may not bring an enforcement action against
an entity for engaging in conduct that the advisory opinion blessed.22
One high-profile example of the AOR process in action involved
the activities of late-night comedian Stephen Colbert. Mr. Colbert
successfully procured an advisory opinion shielding The Colbert
Report’s parent company, Viacom, from having to open its books to
the Commission when the Report “reported” on the activities of
Colbert’s farcical independent- expenditure-only committee (“Super
PAC”) Americans For a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow.23 Thanks to
the FEC’s advisory opinion system, Stephen Colbert and more
serious entities can ensure that their actions will not initiate a
multiyear FEC investigation with the possibility of fines and the
certainty of legal fees. Such risks are significant for entities like
Viacom, but they are devastating for smaller groups that simply
cannot run the risk of costs that would total many times their
operating budgets. Allowing entities to check with the FEC—rather
than gambling on the advice of a lawyer or a lay reading of the law—
provides the type of bright-line guidance necessary when dealing with
political speech and associational rights. As Justice Kennedy wrote in
Citizens United, “[t]he First Amendment does not permit laws that
force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct
demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before
discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”24
In practice, of course, many entities and individuals—especially
those involved with resource-intensive federal elections—are
represented by counsel. But the FEC’s advisory opinion power still
remains a model. By and large the states have not implemented
systems that offer the same level of certainty or flexibility.25 This

19. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(1) (2006).
20. Id. § 437f(c)(2).
21. See Nat’l Def. Comm., AO 2012-27 (F.E.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (advisory opinion)
(issued after being requested on July 26, 2012).
22. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(2).
23. See Colbert, AO 2011-11 (F.E.C. June 30, 2011) (advisory opinion).
24. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
25. Another important issue in many states stems from the lack of any rulemaking
procedure that allows statutes to be conformed to constitutional rulings of the
Supreme Court. Such decisions often alter elements of state campaign finance
systems, but legislation or a court order is necessary before those alterations are
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places would-be actors in the awkward position of either not speaking
or being forced to sue in order to ascertain their rights. The Center
for Competitive Politics is currently representing one such client, the
Coalition for Secular Government, in such a case in Colorado.26 The
result is precisely the situation that Justice Kennedy inveighed
against: a small organization not knowing what it can and cannot do,
and having no option short of litigation for finding out.
Unfortunately, thirty-eight states—nearly three-quarters of the
Union—have failed to replicate the FEC’s advisory opinion system.27
Instead, many states offer either no such mechanism—forcing
speakers to guess as to what is permitted—or have created complex
systems that render any guidance illusory.28 These failures actively
chill speech by making attorneys indispensable to organizations,
many of which are small and cannot pay experienced counsel, that
must understand state regulatory systems.
To demonstrate the wide diversity of state advisory opinion
regimes, we have selected a sampling of states from our survey. Some
states, such as Vermont and North Dakota, simply have no route for
authoritative guidance aside from suing a state agency for a
declaratory judgment. It is impossible to obtain an advisory opinion
in those states. Others, such as Florida, have systems which, despite
having all the necessary components, have crippled the overall
system’s effectiveness by spreading its various functions across
multiple agencies. And in Colorado, elements of an advisory opinion
system exist, but there is no mechanism that grants the procurer of a
favorable opinion any safe harbor. Other states, such as Alabama
and Texas, combine these errors in various ways. Finally, a small

accepted. For instance, in the aftermath of the SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686
(D.C. Cir. 2010), case which permitted the creation of so-called “Super PACs,” some
states provided no avenue for determining whether such groups were permitted by
state law. The result is that agencies are still forced to abide by plainly
unconstitutional laws placing contribution limits on, or outright prohibiting,
committees structured purely for independent expenditures.
26. Coal. for Secular Gov’t v. Gessler, No. 1:12-cv-01708-JLM-KLM (D. Colo.
Sept. 20, 2012).
27. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington State, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Table 1.
28. See supra note 27.

DICKERSON & MORGAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:24 PM

STATE LEVEL ADVISORY OPINIONS

779

vanguard of states, including Delaware, have emulated—or even
improved upon—the federal model.
II. COLORADO: A TOOTHLESS A DVISORY SYSTEM
The bulk of Colorado’s campaign finance requirements may be
found in Article XXVIII of the state constitution.29 These are
complex, and have been the subject of significant litigation.30 But
there is one point of clarity: a single state officer, the Secretary of
State, is charged with enforcement of the law.31 State statutes make
this clear, providing the Secretary with a number of significant powers
relevant to elections. These include making “uniform interpretations
of [the election] code” (with the assistance of the Attorney General)
and enforcing the election laws through suits for injunctive action.32
But here the Colorado system first diverges from that of the FEC.
For although the Secretary issues advisory opinions, it is not a
common practice and there is no statutory basis for doing so.33
Indeed, the system is decidedly informal: one recent advisory opinion
request, submitted through counsel, expressed confusion as to
whether the Secretary of State or the Attorney General should issue
an opinion, and refers to “conversations”—not legal authority—
designating the former.34
This informal monopoly may contribute to the principal flaw in the
Colorado system. While the Secretary appears to be the only officer
providing advisory opinions on campaign finance topics, and while he
has been assigned by the state constitution to conduct rulemakings
and otherwise serve as the authoritative interpreter of state elections
laws,35 he is not the sole enforcer of those provisions.

29. See COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1.
30. See, e.g., Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010); Coal. for
Secular Gov’t v. Gessler, 12-cv-01708-JLK-KLM (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2012);
Independence Inst. v. Coffman, 209 P.3d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
31. The exception is for cases involving the Secretary of State him or herself,
which are referred to the Attorney General. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 9(1)(f).
32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-107(1)(c), (2)(d) (2012).
33. It appears that the Secretary has issued nineteen opinions since 2010. See
Advisory Opinions, Agency Decisions and Litigation, COLO. SECRETARY ST.,
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/CampaignFinance/opinion.html (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013).
34. Letter from Steven Gold, Gen. Counsel, ActBlue, to Paris Nelson, Elections
Divs., Colo. Sec’y of State’s Office (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/CampaignFinance/files/ActBlueAO.pdf.
35. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 9(1)(b).
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The Colorado Constitution specifically provides for complaints to
be made to the Secretary of State by “any person” who believes
Colorado’s campaign finance laws have been violated.36
The
Secretary then “shall” refer such complaints to an administrative law
judge who “shall” hold a hearing and issue a ruling.37 Any appeals are
made, not to the Secretary, but to the Court of Appeals.38 And while
the Secretary is instructed to file an enforcement action following
such a ruling, should he fail to do so, a private right of action exists
for the complainant to do so directly.39
While not involving a formal advisory opinion, at least one
organization sought the advice of the Secretary of State, acted upon
that advice, and was subsequently found to have violated Colorado
law as a result of a private action brought by an advocacy group. In
2009, a group called Clear the Bench was formed to advocate for the
removal of state supreme court justices up for their retention votes.40
It originally applied to be a political committee—one that advocates
for or against candidates for election and, consequently, one that may
accept only limited contributions.41 But on the advice of the Secretary
of State’s staff, Clear the Bench registered as an issue committee,
which may accept unlimited contributions.42 This decision was later
successfully challenged in a state administrative proceeding brought
by Colorado Ethics Watch, an advocacy organization dedicated to
stiffening campaign finance regulations in Colorado.43 That opinion
was upheld on appeal, with the court specifically noting that the views
of the Secretary of State (who participated as amicus curiae in favor
of Clear the Bench) were not entitled to deference because there had

36. COLO CONST. art. XXVIII, § 9(2)(a). While technically limited to certain
violations, the relevant provisions cover the vast majority of campaign finance rules
found in the state constitution.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. That Colorado allows anyone to enforce its campaign finance laws,
including advocacy groups that would not have standing to do so in federal court,
only compounds the problem.
40. About CTBC, CLEAR THE BENCH COLO., http://www.clearthebench
colorado.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
41. Colo. Ethics Watch v. Clear the Bench Colo., 277 P.3d 931, 933 (Colo. App.
2012); see also Joseph Boven, Colorado SOS Staff Advised Clear the Bench to File as
an Issue Committee, COLO. INDEP. (May 10, 2010), http://coloradoindependent.com/
52966/colorado-sos-advised-clear-the-bench-to-file-as-an-issues-committee (linking
to email from the Secretary’s staff to Clear the Bench).
42. Boven, supra note 41.
43. See Colo. Ethics Watch, 227 P.3d at 931.
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been no formal adjudication or rulemaking44—precisely the function
that would be served by a formal advisory opinion rendered pursuant
to statute. Indeed, the advice of the Secretary’s staff was not even
found to be “persuasive” authority.45
Clear the Bench is a notable ruling for another, simpler reason.
The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that Clear the Bench was a
political committee.46 But the Secretary of State had advised it
differently, and appeared before the court as amicus curiae to say so.47
A binding advisory opinion power would have avoided this
unfortunate conflict.
But, more concretely, what sensible
organization would ignore the opinion of the Secretary—the state’s
sole campaign finance authority—and instead guess as to the future
opinion of a state court?
In short, the Colorado Secretary of State may issue advisory
opinions, but those opinions have no force of law, and do not, if
followed, immunize requesters from legal harm. And there are real
costs to this uncertainty: Colorado’s civil penalties are draconian,
reaching up to five times the value of illegal contributions, or fines of
$50 per day (including weekends and holidays) for late reports.48 For
those individuals and groups functioning under the ambiguous rule of
Colorado’s campaign finance laws, there can be no safe harbor, short
of that provided by a lawsuit.
III. FLORIDA: TOO MANY MOVING PARTS
In Florida, the problem is not that there is no advisory opinion
system. One exists, run out of the state’s Division of Elections.49 The
difficulty is that the Division of Elections is not the state’s only
elections agency.
The Division (which is housed within Florida’s Department of
State) may issue opinions that “until amended or revoked, shall be
binding on any person or organization who sought the opinion or with
reference to whom the opinion was sought.”50 And unlike some states

44. Id. at 937.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 932.
47. See id.
48. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 10(2).
49. Division of Election Advisory Opinions, FLA. DIVISION ELECTIONS,
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/TOC_Opinions.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
50. FLA. STAT. § 106.23(2) (2012).
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that restrict advisory opinions to constitutional officers,51 the Division
issues advisory opinions “when requested by any supervisor of
elections, candidate, local officer having election-related duties,
political party, . . . political committee, committee of continuous
existence, or other person or organization engaged in political
activity, relating to any provisions or possible violations of Florida
election laws.”52 Florida’s advisory opinions are considered binding
on the Division and other parties “and a court is not authorized to
overturn the agency’s determination unless it is contrary to the
language of the statute or clearly erroneous.”53
But Florida fails to conform to the federal model because it has
divided its enforcement and advisory opinion authorities. While the
Division of Elections has authority to run elections, it is the Florida
Elections Commission (somewhat-confusingly abbreviated “FEC”)
that has “[j]urisdiction to investigate and determine violations of [the
campaign finance statutes].”54 The FEC is technically housed within
the Attorney General’s office, but its enabling statutes make its
independence clear.55 The Commission’s members are appointed by
the state’s governor with input from the state house and state senate
leadership.56 Florida’s own FEC may not give advisory opinions, and
must “adhere to statutory law and advisory opinions of the division.”57
At first glance, having two separate entities to regulate campaign
finance seems defensible as a means to provide checks and balances
in an inherently political environment. But there is a significant
structural problem with the Division/FEC divide. The Division of
Elections is largely structured by statute for handling ballot access
and voting registration. Yet it has the vestigial responsibility of
issuing advisory opinions and referring potential violations of the law
to the FEC, which is somewhat more independent than the Secretary

51. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(7) (2012).
52. FLA. STAT. § 106.23(2).
53. Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Yarborough, 275 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973)).
54. FLA. STAT. § 106.25(1).
55. Id. § 106.24(1)(a) (“The commission shall not be subject to control,
supervision, or direction by the Department of Legal Affairs or the Attorney General
in the performance of its duties, including, but not limited to, personnel, purchasing
transactions involving real or personal property, and budgetary matters.”).
56. Id. § 106.24(1)(b).
57. See id. § 106.26(13); see also Frequently Asked Questions, FLA. ELECTIONS
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.state.fl.us/FECWebFi.nsf/pages/FAQs (last visited Mar.
7, 2013).
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of State, who is merely appointed by the Governor.58 Furthermore, as
a result of this division, committees are expected to keep their books
open to both the Division of Elections (which can refer potential
violations to the FEC) and the Commission itself, which does the
actual investigations. The agencies’ “right of inspection may be
enforced by appropriate writ issued by any court of competent
jurisdiction.”59
While this may seem like a marginal inconvenience, repeated
dealings with state agencies requesting books and information (all
while determining whether an accidental violation will trigger
penalties) can serve as a real impediment to smaller groups. As the
Colorado examples make clear,60 small entities with little
sophistication deserve a system that is as straightforward and nonduplicative as possible. This goal would be helped by the Florida
legislature folding the advisory opinion and campaign finance wings
of the State Department into the FEC.
Additionally, the statutes make clear that the FEC is not the only
entity that may enforce the campaign finance laws. The statute does
not “limit[] the jurisdiction of any other officers or agencies of
government empowered by law to investigate, act upon, or dispose of
alleged violations of this code.”61 This should be clarified to, at
minimum, require other such agencies—to the extent feasible—to
give due deference to the safe harbor that an advisory opinion
creates.
In short, Florida’s principal flaw is that its system is overly complex
and provides no clear legal safe harbor for advisory opinion
requesters. But there is statutory basis for such opinions, and they
are entitled to some deference as a result.
IV. VERMONT AND NORTH DAKOTA: NO GUIDANCE
WHATSOEVER
As messy as Colorado’s private right of action regime and as
duplicative as Florida’s divided system may be, there are states that
simply provide political speakers with no clear way to obtain
authoritative advice. Both Vermont and North Dakota lack advisory
58. Steve Bousquest & Jeffrey S. Solochek, Kurt Browning Resigns as Florida’s
Secretary of State, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/
news/education/k12/kurt-browning-resigns-as-floridas-secretary-of-state/1210128.
59. FLA. STAT. § 106.04(6).
60. See, e.g., supra note 30.
61. FLA. STAT. § 106.25(1).
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opinion systems, and North Dakota maintains an enforcement
method that seems particularly ripe for abuse.
While both states offer campaign finance guides to help
committees and candidates walk through their systems,62 they also
both disclaim that the guides offer any legal safe harbor.63 The North
Dakota campaign finance guide encourages would-be players to abide
only by the North Dakota Century Code, the state’s formal collection
of statutes.64 Both states’ Attorneys General profess to offer advisory
opinions, which—at first glance—seem to solve the problem of
uncertainty. But North Dakota’s constitution limits the recipients of
such opinions to a list of state constitutional officers. And Vermont’s
Attorney General is permitted to “advise the elective and appointive
state officers on questions of law relating to their official duties and
shall furnish a written opinion on such matters, when so requested.”65
While the office is not statutorily compelled to offer opinions to
others outside of the state’s officers, it will “in those rare instances
where the opinion may resolve a major dispute or uncertainty in the
law and where large numbers of people may be affected.”66 But the
state has not issued an opinion since 2008, and has only issued eleven
opinions since 2000.67 And the state has never promulgated such an
opinion in answer to a question from a grassroots committee or an
election campaign.68
Both Vermont and North Dakota place their campaign finance
officials within the office of the Secretary of State.69 And while a
committee treasurer or inexperienced candidate might be able to get
guidance from a phone call to either state’s agency, there is no safe
harbor of the type offered by an advisory opinion.

62. See OFFICE OF VT.’S SEC’Y OF STATE, GUIDE TO VERMONT’S CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW (2012), available at http://vermont-elections.org/elections1/
2012%20CF%20Guide%204.12.12.pdf; N.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, HELPFUL CAMPAIGN
PRACTICES (2011), available at https://vip.sos.nd.gov/pdfs/Portals/camp-helppract.pdf.
63. See N.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 62 at 2.
64. Id.
65. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 159 (2012).
66. Attorney General Opinions, OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.atg.state.vt.us/
issues/attorney-general-opinions.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Elections & Campaign Finance Division, VT. SECRETARY ST.,
http://vermont-elections.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013); Campaign Financial
Disclosure, N.D. SECRETARY ST., http://www.nd.gov/sos/campfinance/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013).
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Disclosure reports and the like are filed with the Secretary of
State’s office in North Dakota:
State’s Attorneys in North Dakota are charged with the primary
statutory authority to prosecute [campaign finance] violations. Yet
North Dakota State’s attorneys, as elected officials, are often
affiliated with one of the major political parties. Consequently, a
State’s Attorney charged with authority to prosecute a campaign
contribution violation is subject to political pressure to prosecute or
not to prosecute, depending upon which party the offending
candidate belongs to.70

In short, the state-level reporting requirements are enforced by local
officials with partisan affiliations. The differences with the federal
system, overseen by an evenly-divided board, are clear.
Similarly, Vermont imposes penalties for violating campaign
finance laws that include fines and the possibility of up to half a year
in prison.71 “In addition to the other penalties . . . , a state’s attorney
or the attorney general may institute any appropriate action,
injunction, or other proceeding to prevent, restrain, correct or abate
any violation” of the campaign finance reporting and contribution
limits sections of the law.72 As in North Dakota, Vermont’s Attorney
General and State’s Attorneys are elected officials. That North
Dakota and Vermont have such limited opportunities for committees
and candidates to obtain binding advisory opinions from a single
campaign finance entity indicates that such a process has not been
viewed as necessary. Similarly, the laws of both states indicate a high
degree of trust in their elected prosecutors.
But as the Institute for Justice and Dr. Jeffrey Milyo have
demonstrated, correctly interpreting campaign finance forms is
difficult, with many of those who attempt to file disclosure reports
asserting that the system is worse than filing taxes with the IRS, and
that a lawyer is necessary to handle all of the requirements and to
guide filers through the many hurdles to a successful filing.73 And

70. Bruce Schoenwald, A Conundrum in a Quagmire: Unraveling North Dakota’s
Campaign Finance Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2006). This understanding was
verified in a conversation between David Silvers of the Center for Competitive
Politics and the Elections Division of the North Dakota Secretary of State on
September 4, 2012.
71. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2806(a) (2012).
72. Id. § 2806(c).
73. Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Red Tape: Strangling Free Speech &
Political Debate, INST. JUST. (Oct. 2007), http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
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serious questions regarding the scope of statutes must be answered
before organizations are faced with fines or forced to rely upon the
tender mercies of a partisan State’s Attorney—particularly when
prison time is available for officers who make mistakes.
This is not a hypothetical. In several states, committees wishing to
form state-level Super PACs were forced to bring suit before
undertaking activities that were clearly constitutional in the aftermath
of SpeechNow.org v. FEC.74 Similarly, text message contributions
were not permitted at the federal level until an advisory opinion from
the FEC permitted them,75 with the result that in the 2012 election
cycle, campaign ads for President Obama included an SMS code for
contributions.76 State legislators passing campaign finance laws in the
1990s or early 2000s could not have foreseen novelties like Super
PACs or text message contributions, and would-be speakers with
access to such innovations cannot safely use them absent litigation.
V. OTHER STATES TEND TO COMBINE ONE OR MORE OF THESE
WEAKNESSES
The examples above illustrate the three main weaknesses
experienced by the majority of states. Indeed, very few states have
systems that combine the three elements of a successful advisory
opinion regime: a single actor for rulemaking, who is also entrusted
with enforcement, and whose advisory opinions immunize the
recipient from legal consequences for following an opinion’s advice.
Texas, for example, has a remarkably good system on its face. The
Texas Ethics Commission is vested with the power to “administer and
enforce” the state’s campaign finance laws.77 The Ethics Commission
also offers advisory opinions at the request of any person “about the
application of any of these laws to the person in regard to a specified
existing or hypothetical factual situation” on campaign finance

other_pubs/CampaignFinanceRedTape.pdf. Dr. Milyo serves as an academic advisor
to the Center for Competitive Politics.
74. E.g., Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012); Pers. PAC v.
McGuffage, 858 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
75. See
FEC Record: Compliance, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/fecrecord/2012/october/txtmessage.shtml (last visited Mar.
7, 2013).
76. See Alina Selyukh, Obama Campaign to Start Accepting Text Message
Donations, REUTERS (Aug. 23 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/08/23/us-usa-campaign-money-idUSBRE87M08U20120823.
77. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 571.061(a)(3) (West 2012).
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questions.78 Reliance on such opinions is “a defense to prosecution or
to imposition of a civil penalty.”79 But the entire system is
undermined by a Colorado-like private right of action. As a result, all
Texans are permitted to sue as functional agents of the state to
enforce the campaign finance laws.80
While Texas law holds that acting in accordance with an Ethics
Commission advisory opinion is a “defense” in such a court case,81 it is
not an absolute defense that would force courts to dismiss a suit.
Consequently, Texas’s system offers incomplete protection against
personal or political litigation by sophisticated actors operating
against grassroots activists.82
Meanwhile, Alabama has cobbled together a system from the
weaknesses of “no guidance” states such as Vermont and North
Dakota, and paired it with the division of authority problem present
in Florida, while adding a new wrinkle of its own. In Alabama,
disclosure and reporting is handled by the office of the Secretary of
State and the county probate judges.83 But enforcement is handled by
the (elected) Attorney General and the (elected) district attorneys.84
And none of these parties may offer an advisory opinion to grassroots
organizers.85

78. Id. § 571.091(a)(7).
79. Id. § 571.097.
80. TEX. ETHICS COMM’N, CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE FOR CANDIDATES AND
OFFICEHOLDERS WHO FILE WITH LOCAL FILING AUTHORITIES 19–20 (Sept. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/guides/coh_local_guide.pdf (“Any citizen
may file a criminal complaint with the district attorney, a civil complaint with the
Ethics Commission, or a civil action against a candidate or officeholder for violations
of title 15.”).
81. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 571.07 (West 2012).
82. See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010).
83. ALA. CODE § 17-5-11 (2012).
84. Both of which are partisan races. See STATE OF ALABAMA, CANVASS OF
RESULTS, GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 2010, at 1–20 (Nov. 22, 2010), available
at http://www.sos.alabama.gov/downloads/election/2010/general/2010GeneralResultsAllStateAndFederalOfficesAndAmendments-CompleteWithWrite-inAppendix.pdf.
85. The Alabama Attorney General is only entitled to give advisory opinions to
certain enumerated officials. ALA. CODE § 36-15-1 (2012). There is also an Alabama
Ethics Commission, which is only permitted to offer advisory opinions on Title 36,
Chapter 25 of the Code of Alabama, while the Fair Campaign Practices Act is
encoded in Title 17 of the Code of Alabama. ALA. CODE § 36-25-4(a)(9) (2012).

DICKERSON & MORGAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

788

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

5/27/2013 7:24 PM

[Vol. XL

VI. DELAWARE: A NEW HOPE86
In Delaware, the State Elections Commissioner supervises the
state’s campaign finance operations.87
The Commissioner is
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state’s Senate for a
term of four years.88 He or she has authority to “[m]ake and publish
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of” the
state’s law and “such rules and regulations shall have the force and
effect of law.”89 In Delaware, the Commissioner is empowered to
“make a ruling” applying the campaign finance laws of the state “to a
set of facts specified” by the requestor.90 “Any candidate or treasurer
who reasonably and in good faith acts in reliance upon any [such]
ruling . . . shall not be liable nor subject to any penalty with respect to
conduct conforming to the ruling.”91
This is an example of good government. Delaware citizens can rest
assured that the Commissioner, who is the sole official responsible for
the state’s campaign finance system, can offer legally binding advice,
and the interpretive certainty such advice provides. Thankfully,
Delaware is not the only state that has built a system that mirrors that
of the FEC. By our count, thirteen of the fifty states employ systems
that correspond to the federal model.92 Most of these states are in the
South and the Midwest, a fact that may surprise some observers of
“good governance.”
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment’s political speech rights are indispensable to
the functioning of our republican government.
The federal

86. New law related to the state’s enforcement regime went into effect on January
1, 2013, after the writing of this Article. This paragraph assumes the reform has
taken place.
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 301 (2012); About the Agency, ST. DEL.,
http://www.elections.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 301. The Commissioner serves at the pleasure of
the Governor—an element that ought to be reformed. While it is possible that an
interpretation of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8042 could grant a private right of action,
it has never been utilized for such a purpose. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8042
(“For purposes of any civil remedy on behalf of any injured person, the Court of
Chancery shall have jurisdiction.”).
89. Id. § 8041.
90. Id. § 8041(2).
91. Id.
92. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See infra Table 1.
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government has created a system where speakers know where to
come for advisory opinions and need only deal with one agency
throughout the enforcement process. But the states have a variety of
systems that suffer from a number of flaws.
As we have discussed, Colorado has enabled every citizen of the
state to become a temporary prosecutor by creating a private right of
action that renders advisory opinions—which are already informal
and unsanctioned—functionally useless. Florida has unnecessarily
complicated an otherwise functioning system by rendering
committees vulnerable to multiple agencies’ interpretations and by
decentralizing some enforcement authority. Vermont and North
Dakota do not provide potential speakers with any administrative
safe harbor. Many other states also suffer from these weaknesses,
singly or in combination.
Other states employ systems that are very close to the federal
model but fail to provide the necessary certainty. Rhode Island, for
example, has a relatively flawless systems but for the states’ failure to
codify a safe harbor for recipients of advisory opinions.93 This is a
minor flaw that can be easily addressed by legislation. Other states
have divided their enforcement agencies for good reasons: in a state
where the Secretary of State is elected, it makes little sense for the
Secretary to be charged with enforcing the campaign finance laws as
to candidates for Secretary of State. Such a workaround makes sense,
but also highlights the importance of making a state’s election
commission a fully independent agency, not attached to any other
elected executive or legislative officer.
States should move toward binding advisory opinions and single
campaign finance authorities. This will provide an avenue for
certainty. But in some states, such as Alabama, Vermont, and North
Dakota, such a system will also remove the ability for abuse of the
law by elected district attorneys. While the district attorneys of these
states are all doubtless upstanding citizens and ethically motivated, no
possibility should exist for the aberrant unscrupulous person to
manipulate a system and suppress political opposition.94 And the
93. See IND. CODE § 3R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-5(c)(1) (2012). While such safe
harbors may, in some cases, be adopted through judicial rulemaking, in the authors’
opinion, one’s First Amendment rights would be better protected by a rigorous safe
harbor provision embodied via statute.
94. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“It may be a reflection on
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government . . . experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.”).
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reactions to such abuses, as the Federal Election Campaign Act
following the scandals of the Nixon administration illustrates, are
often overbroad and may unduly damage the freedom of speech.
As a result, it is no surprise that in the absence of clarity in the
state campaign finance systems, many would-be players and activists
will choose not to speak at all, rather than bring costly litigation to
ensure their rights in advance. And this will continue to happen in
spite of the Supreme Court’s assurance that “[t]he First Amendment
does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance
attorney . . . or seek declaratory rulings [in court] before discussing
the most salient political issues of our day.”95
The debate over the proper scope of campaign finance regulation
will continue, but all parties should agree that the rules—whatever
they may be—should be clear. State-level campaign finance opinions
given by a single entity, which enjoys a monopoly over state
enforcement actions, and which immunize the requester, should be
that rare thing in our modern political life: an uncontroversial policy
choice.

95. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
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96. A note on methodology. State laws are in constant flux; this information was
compiled in late 2012. Any changes should not undermine the necessity of this
paper’s policy proposal. Similarly, unless a statute specifically provided for a safe
harbor, we viewed the state’s advisory opinion process as not offering one. This view
is consistent with the need for explicit, clear immunity from suit.
97. See supra note 83–85 and accompanying text.
98. Both the Secretary of State and the judges of the probate courts are given the
authority to “accept and file all reports and statements” from the various committees
and campaigns. ALA. CODE § 17-5-11 (2012). Yet, the law is largely enforced by the
Attorney General’s office. See Rogers, AO 99-39 (Ala. Ethics Comm’n Oct. 6, 1999)
(advisory opinion).
99. Section 15.13 of the Alaska Statutes seems to envision the Commission as the
sole enforcer of the law, although it may be possible for the Attorney General’s office
to act independently. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13 (2012).
100. Under section 15.13.374 of the Alaska Statutes, any person may petition the
Alaska Public Offices Commission for an advisory opinion. Id. § 15.13.374.
101. Under section 15.13.374(e) of the Alaska Statutes, complaints may not be
considered about persons who acted according to advisory opinions; even if they
were not the requesters. Id. § 15.13.374 (e).
102. Under section 16-924 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, the Arizona Secretary
of State’s office notifies the attorney general regarding statewide election violations,
the county elections officer notifies the county or city/town attorney “as
appropriate.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-924 (2012). Appeals from fines levied by
these officers for lack of compliance is appealable to the state superior courts. Id.
However, under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-905(L):
If the filing officer, attorney general or county attorney fails to institute an
action within forty-five working days after receiving a complaint under
subsection K of this section, the individual filing the complaint may bring a
civil action in the individual's own name and at the individual's own
expense, with the same effect as if brought by the filing officer, attorney
general or county attorney. The individual shall execute a bond payable to
the defendant if the individual fails to prosecute the action successfully. The
court shall award to the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney fees.
103. The Arizona Attorney General’s office may issue advisory opinions to county
attorneys, but “does not issue opinions for private citizens.” See Attorney General
Opinions, ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN. TOM HORNE, http://www.azag.gov/opinions/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013).
104. Power is specifically divided between the State Board of Election
Commissioners, the Arkansas Ethics Commission, and the law enforcement arm of
the state. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-4-118 (2012).
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105. The Arkansas Ethics Commission is permitted to issue advisory opinions
regarding the elements of the state’s election laws that fall under its bailiwick. Id. § 76-217(g)(2).
106. The statutes are unclear as to whether or not an advisory opinion from the
Ethics Commission constitutes a safe harbor.
107. Section 83114 of the California Government Code specifically notes that the
Fair Political Practices Commission is not the sole enforcement authority for
violations of campaign practices. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 83114 (West 2012).
108. Under section 83114, the Fair Political Practices Commission is permitted to
issue advisory opinions and advice letters to requestors. Id.
109. Under the same section, such opinions or letters provide a safe harbor.
Advice letters are not a complete defense regarding criminal or civil proceedings, but
reliance on a letter is a safe harbor regarding commission proceedings. Advisory
opinions do constitute a safe harbor regarding criminal or civil proceedings. Id.
110. See supra notes 29–48 and accompanying text.
111. Under section 9-7b of the General Statutes of Connecticut, the State Elections
Enforcement Commission serves as the conduit for all campaign finance violations.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-7b (2012). But under section 9-625 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut, state referees and judges of the Superior Court are given investigatory
authority “upon the written request of any state’s attorney or any assistant state’s
attorney.” Id. § 9-625.
112. Section 9-7b(14) of the General Statutes of Connecticut grants the
Commission power to “issue upon request and publish advisory opinions in the
Connecticut Law Journal.” Id. § 9-7b(14).
113. The statute is unclear as to the legal safe harbor afforded by the opinions.
114. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
116. Under section 21-5-6, the Government Transparency and Campaign Finance
Commission is the campaign finance clearinghouse. GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-5-6 (2012).
117. Id. § 21-5-6(a)(13).
118. Id.
119. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-314 (2012).
120. Id. § 11-315.
121. Id.
122. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 34-201, 34-202 (2012).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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125. Under chapter 10, act 5, section 1A-8 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, Illinois
centralized the enforcement of the campaign finance system in the State Board of
Elections. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1A-8 (2012). However, Illinois does maintain a
limited private right of action for complainants in cases where the Board fails to act.
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/922 (2012).
126. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
127. Id.
128. The Indiana Election Commission is authorized to “[c]arry out” the campaign
finance provisions of the state code. IND. CODE § 3-6-4.1-14 (2012); but Indiana splits
some enforcement with the Election Division of the Secretary of State’s office. See
IND. CODE § 3-6-4.2-2 (2012); IND. ELECTION DIV., 2012 INDIANA CAMPAIGN
FINANCE MANUAL 82 (2011), available at http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/
files/2012_Campaign_Finance_Manual_11-1-11_version.pdf.
129. The commission is empowered to “[i]ssue advisory opinions.” Id. § 3-6-4.1-25.
130. The statute is unclear as to whether or not a safe harbor exists. Id.
Furthermore, it appears that an advisory opinion has not been issued since 2001. See
Ind. Election Comm’n, Campaign Finance Advisory Opinions, IND. SECRETARY ST.,
http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/IEC_Campaign_Finance_Advisory_Opinions.pd
f (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
131. It is a duty of the Independent Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board to
“[e]stablish and impose penalties, and recommendations for punishment of persons
who are subject to penalties of or punishment by the board or by other bodies, for the
failure to comply with the requirements of this chapter, chapter 68A, or section 8.7.”
IOWA CODE § 68B.32A(9) (2013). This opening for “other bodies” seems to
eliminate the certainty of a unitary enforcement agency.
132. The Board permits advisory opinions. Id. §68B.32A(12).
133. “Advice contained in board advisory opinions shall, if followed, constitute a
defense to a complaint . . . that is based on the same facts and circumstances.” Id.
134. “The Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission (GEC) is charged with
administering, interpreting and enforcing the Campaign Finance Act and laws
relating to conflict of interests, financial disclosure and the regulation of lobbying.”
Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission Homepage, GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS
COMMISSION, http://www.kansas.gov/ethics/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
135. Advisory opinions are issued by the Governmental Ethics Commission.
Opinions, GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS COMMISSION, http://www.kansas.gov/ethics/
Opinions/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
136. Id. (“The Commission’s advisory opinions serve to interpret the laws under
the Commission’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-254 and KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 25-4159, any person who acts in accordance with the provisions of such an
opinion shall be presumed to have complied with the provisions of the applicable
conflict of interests, lobbying, or campaign finance laws.”).
137. While the State Board of Elections “shall administer the election laws of the
state,” Kentucky treats the “regulation of elections” differently than the “regulation
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of campaign finance.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.120 (West 2012). The state’s
Registry of Election Finance is empowered with enforcing the campaign finance
statutes in the state. Id. However, “[t]he Attorney General, Commonwealth’s
attorney, the registry, or any qualified voter may sue for injunctive relief to compel
compliance with the provisions of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121.056 and Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 121.120 to 121.230.” Id. § 121.990(5).
138. The Registry is required to “render a written advisory opinion . . . to the
person making [a] request not later than thirty (30) days after the registry receives
the request.” Id. § 121.135(1).
139. Under section 121.135(4)(b) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated, a
safe harbor is granted to the requester regardless of who attempts to bring a charge.
Id. § 121.135(4)(b). However, section 121.135(4)(c) pointedly notes that it is not a
defense for others who relied on the opinion who were “not the person or committee
involved in the specific transaction or activity with respect to which the advisory
opinion was rendered.” Id. § 121.135(4)(c).
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1511.1 (2012) (“The Board of Ethics is placed in
charge of enforcing the campaign finance rules as a ‘supervisory committee.’”).
141. Id. § 18:1511.2B (“The supervisory committee may render an advisory opinion
concerning the application of a general provision of this Chapter, or a general
provision prescribed as a rule or regulation by the committee. The supervisory
committee may render an opinion in response to a request by any public official, any
candidate for public office, any political committee, or the committee may render an
advisory opinion on its own initiative. Such an opinion shall not constitute a rule
under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act and the supervisory
committee shall not be subject to that Act in carrying out the provisions of this
Subsection.”).
142. The state’s ethics rules do not clearly state that an advisory opinion serves as a
legal safe harbor. See STATE OF LOUISIANA RULES FOR THE BOARD OF ETHICS ch. 6
(2012), available at http://www.ethics.state.la.us/Pub/Other/rules.pdf.
143. The Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices is placed in
charge of administering Maine’s campaign finance rules. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21, §
1003 (2011).
144. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 2-102 (West 2012).
145. Chapter 55, section 33(a) of the General Laws of Massachusetts provides
voters a private right of action for certain campaign finance violations. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 55, § 33(a) (2012).
146. Id. ch. 55, § 3 (“He shall, from time to time as he deems necessary or
advisable, issue rules and regulations in conformity with the provisions of this chapter
and chapter thirty A, and shall also issue interpretative bulletins and respond with
reasonable promptness to requests for information, interpretations and advice
presented by candidates, state committees, political committees and members of the
public.”).
147. Section 169.215 of the Michigan Compiled Laws places the Michigan
Secretary of State in charge of the campaign finance regime. MICH. COMP. LAWS §
169.215 (2012).

DICKERSON & MORGAN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

5/27/2013 7:24 PM

STATE LEVEL ADVISORY OPINIONS
Yes.150
No.153
Yes.154
No.157
No.159
Yes.161

Yes.151
No.
Yes.155
Yes.158
No.160
No.

795

Yes.152
No.
Yes.156
No.
No.
No.

148. Section 169.215 permits the Secretary to issue “declaratory rulings” which are
analogous to advisory opinions. Id.
149. “A declaratory ruling is binding on the Department and the requestor.”
Elections in Michigan: Declaratory Rulings and Interpretative Statements,
MICHIGAN.GOV,
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670,7-127-1633_23669---,00.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
150. MINN. STAT. § 10A.02, subdiv. 11 (2012).
151. Id. § 10A.02, subdiv. 12.
152. Id. § 10A.02, subdiv. 12(b).
153. Section 23-15-903 of the Annotated Mississippi Code gives the county
commissioners the power to enforce violations of the election laws. MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 23-15-903 (2012).
154. Missouri splits the election authority for certain offices between local
authorities and the state ethics commission. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.026 (2012). But
investigatory and enforcement powers seem lodged in the ethics commission. Id. §
130.054.
155. See Advisory Opinions, MO. ETHICS COMMISSION, http://www.mec.mo.gov/
EthicsWeb/Opinions/Opinions.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
156. Id. (“Any Advisory opinion issued by the Ethics Commission shall act as legal
direction to any person requesting such opinion. However, anyone examining such
advisory opinion should be careful to note that an opinion of the Missouri Ethics
Commission deals only with the specific request to which the opinion responded and
only as to the law as it existed at the date of the response.”).
157. Section 13-37-125 of the Montana Code Annotated, the county attorneys
share investigatory power with the Commissioner of Political Practices, who is
permitted to hire his own attorneys to “prosecute violations of” the election code.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-113 (2012).
158. See Campaign Finance and Practices Opinions, MONT. COMMISSIONER POL.
PRACS., http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/5campaignfinance/opinions.mcpx (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013).
159. Under section 32-202 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, the Secretary of
State is charged with enforcement of the campaign finance laws. NEB. REV. STAT. §
32-202 (2012). However, enforcement is housed with the Nebraska Accountability
and Disclosure Commission. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1612 (2012).
160. Under section 32-201 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, “[t]he Secretary of
State shall decide disputed points of election law. The decisions shall have the force
of law until changed by the courts.” Id. § 32-201. However, the statute does not
provide a vehicle for the Secretary to promulgate an advisory opinion. Id. The
statutes give no such authority to the Commission either.
161. Under sections 294A.410 and 294A.420 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, the
Secretary of State is placed in charge of enforcing the state’s campaign finance
regime. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 294A.410, 294A.420 (2011).
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162. Section 666:8 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated provides
that “[t]he attorney general shall be responsible for the enforcement of the election
laws.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 666:8 (2013); see also id. § 7:6-c.
163. New Hampshire’s list of powers granted to the Attorney General does not
include the power to promulgate advisory opinions. Id. §§ 7:7 to :8.
164. Under section 19:44A-6(b) of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, the
Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC) is empowered “to enforce the
provisions” of the campaign finance law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-6(b) (West 2012).
165. Under section 19:44A-6(f) of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, the
Commission is empowered to issue advisory opinions upon request. Id. § 19:44A-6(f).
166. The statute does not specifically offer a safe harbor for a requester. Id.
167. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-4-5 (2012) (“The bureau of elections shall perform those
duties pertaining to the state administration of elections as are assigned by the
secretary of state and which are pursuant to the election laws of the state.”); see also
id. § 1-19-36B (“The Campaign Reporting Act [N.M. Stat. Ann. §1-19-25 (1978)] may
be enforced by the attorney general or the district attorney in the county where the
candidate resides, where a political committee has its principal place of business or
where the violation occurred.”).
168. Id. § 1-19-34.4.
169. The statute does not specifically provide a safe harbor. Id.
170. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-104 (McKinney 2012) (“The state board of elections shall
have jurisdiction of, and be responsible for, the execution and enforcement of the
provisions of article fourteen of this chapter and other statutes governing campaigns,
elections and related procedures.”); see also id. § 14-126(1) (“Any person who fails to
file a statement required to be filed by this article shall be subject to a civil penalty,
not in excess of . . . one thousand dollars, to be recoverable in a special proceeding or
civil action to be brought by the state board of elections or other board of
elections.”).
171. Although not spelled out in the statute, the Board does issue formal
interpretative opinions. However, there is no statutory backing for doing so under
the present code. Id.
172. Section 163-278.22 of the General Statutes of North Carolina gives control of
the campaign finance system to the State Board of Elections. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163278.22 (2012).
173. Section 163-278.23 gives the Executive Director of the Board of Elections the
power to issue advisory opinions upon request of interested parties. Id. § 163-278.23.
174. Id. (“If the candidate, communications media, political committees,
referendum committees, or other entities rely on and comply with the opinion of the
Executive Director of the Board of Elections, then prosecution or civil action on
account of the procedure followed pursuant thereto and prosecution for failure to
comply with the statute inconsistent with the written ruling of the Executive Director
of the Board of Elections issued to the candidate or committee involved shall be
barred.”).
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175. See supra Part IV.
176. Sections 3517.151–153 of Baldwin’s Ohio Revised Code Annotated place the
enforcement of campaign finance in the hands of the Ohio Elections Commission.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.151–153 (West 2012). A private right of action in
mandamus was specifically denied in State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v.
Blackwell, 855 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2006).
177. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.153(D).
178. Id. (“When the commission renders an advisory opinion relating to a specific
set of circumstances involving any of those sections stating that there is no violation
of a provision in those sections, the person to whom the opinion is directed or a
person who is similarly situated may reasonably rely on the opinion and is immune
from criminal prosecution and a civil action, including, without limitation, a civil
action for removal from public office or employment, based on facts and
circumstances covered by the opinion.”).
179. Although Title 26, Chapter A1 of the Oklahoma Statutes deals with elections,
elements related to campaign finance were recodified and given to the authority of
the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. However, the Commission specifically notes that
“[a] decision by the Commission does not limit the power of . . . the Attorney
General, district attorneys, or a multi-county grand jury to investigate and/or
prosecute alleged crimes.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 257:30-1-4(e) (2012).
180. Id. § 257:1-1-6(h) (“The [Oklahoma Ethics] Commission may, in its discretion
and where appropriate, issue ethics interpretations pertaining to the provisions of this
title when requested by any person or committee who may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.”).
181. Id. (“Provided further, such interpretation shall be binding on the
Commission in any subsequent proceeding under this title.”). However, the statute
does not suggest that it is binding upon other actors.
182. Generally, the Secretary of State handles enforcement, but “[a] complaint
alleging a violation involving the Secretary of State, a candidate for the office of
Secretary of State, or any political committee or person supporting the Secretary of
State or a candidate for the office of Secretary of State may be filed with the
Attorney General.” OR. REV. STAT. § 260.345 (2012).
183. Pennsylvania’s election laws are enforced by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. See 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2621 (West 2013).
184. See id.
185. See
About
Us,
R.I.
ST.
BOARD
ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.state.ri.us/about/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (“The mission of the
Board of Elections is to protect the integrity of the electoral process and to
effectively and efficiently administer the provisions of the election laws of the United
States and the State of Rhode Island including, but not limited to, the governance
and conduct of elections, voter registration, campaign finance, public funding of
campaigns and any other duties prescribed by law.”).
186. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-5(c)(1) (2012).
187. Id. § 17-25-5. The statute does not explicitly offer a safe harbor.
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188. South Carolina has a state Ethics Commission to enforce all of its campaign
finance rules, although the South Carolina State Election Commission runs the
state’s elections. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-10, 8-13-320 (2012).
189. The Ethics Commission is given the authority to issue advisory opinions. Id. §
8-13-320.
190. The Commission’s power to issue advisory opinions is predicated on the fact
“that an opinion rendered by the commission, until amended or revoked, is binding
on the commission in any subsequent charges concerning the person who requested
the opinion and who acted in reliance on it in good faith.” Id.
191. While disclosure is handled by the Secretary of State, “[t]he attorney general
is responsible for investigating any violations related to the campaign finance
regulations in South Dakota.” CHRIS NELSON, SEC’Y OF STATE, SOUTH DAKOTA
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORTING GUIDELINES UPDATED AUGUST 2010, at 13 (2010),

available

at

http://sdsos.gov/content/html/elections/electvoterpdfs/2012/Guide%20to%20South%
20Dakota%20Campaign%20Finance%20Regulations2010Update.pdf. Yet certain
administrative penalties may be assessed by the Secretary of State. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 12-27-29.2 (2012). Furthermore, state’s attorneys are granted some
investigatory and prosecutorial power for civil actions at the local level. Id. § 12-2740.
192. The Attorney General may only give opinions “upon all questions of law
submitted to him by the Legislature or either branch thereof, or by the Governor.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-7-90 (2012) (emphasis omitted). The Secretary of State has
no power to grant advisory opinions. Id. § 1-8-1.
193. Tennessee’s campaign finance laws are enforced by the state’s Bureau of
Ethics and Campaign Finance. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-55-103 (2012). County election
commissions do overview financial disclosure of candidates, but are not engaged in
statewide campaign finance. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-10-105. The Tennessee State
Election Commission does not handle campaign finance. Cf. State Election
Commission, TENN. SECRETARY ST., http://tn.gov/sos/election/statecom.htm (follow
“About the State Election Commission” tab) (last visited May 24, 2013). There is a
Tennessee Ethics Commission, which focuses on lobbying laws, not campaign
finance. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-6-102.
194. Id. § 2-10-207(3).
195. Id. (stating that the advisory opinions “may be relied upon without threat of
sanction with respect to the issue addressed by the opinion, if the candidate or
committee conforms the candidate’s or committee’s conduct to the requirements of
the advisory opinion”).
196. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
197. Texas has a private right of action. TEX. ETHICS COMM’N, supra note 80, at 18.
198. Campaign finance and elections are run through the office of the lieutenant
governor. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-11-101, 20A-11-104 (West 2012); see, e.g.,
Disclosure Requirements, UTAH LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.utah.gov/campaign-finance/disclosure-requirements (last visited
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Mar. 8, 2013). However, the state grants a private right of action to registered voters.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-703 (West 2012).
199. The lieutenant governor’s office does not have statutory authority to issue
advisory opinions.
200. See supra Part IV.
201. Under Title 24.2 of the Code of Virginia, the State Board of Elections serves
as the campaign finance clearinghouse. Yet, complaints of election law offenses are
run through the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s offices. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1019
(2012).
202. Id.
203. The Public Disclosure Commission handles only campaign disclosure, not
limits on giving or other rules. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.105 (2012). Enforcement
is also handled by the attorney general and prosecuting attorneys, as well as through
a private right of action. Id. § 42.17A.765.
204. The Government Accountability Board is charged with enforcing and
administering the election and campaign finance laws of Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. §
5.05(1) (2013). However, the statute specifically notes that the law may be enforced
by the district attorneys, and electors may choose between the two “where their
authority is concurrent” requesting civil action be brought. WIS. STAT. § 11.60(4)–(5)
(2013). If the state fails to act, “[a]ny elector may sue for injunctive relief to compel
compliance with this chapter.” WIS. STAT. § 11.66 (2013).
205. Id. § 5.05(6a) (“No person acting in good faith upon an advisory opinion
issued by the board is subject to criminal or civil prosecution for so acting, if the
material facts are as stated in the opinion request.”).
206. Wyoming maintains a private right of action for candidates and parties, the
law is enforced by district attorneys and the attorney general, yet the Secretary of
State is the chief election officer for the state. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-25-108, 22-2103 (2012).
207. The Secretary “shall prepare . . . [a]dvice or request from the attorney
general’s office advisory opinions on the effect of elections laws and their application,
operation and interpretation.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-121 (2012). The Attorney
General may issue advisory opinions, but only to state officers and either branch of
the legislature. Id.

